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NOTE
IT’S A BIRD, IT’S A PLANE! BUT
MANUFACTURERS HAVE NO DUTY TO
TRAIN: WHEN FINDING NO DUTY IN
MINNESOTA PRODUCTS LIABILITY




In July 2012, the Minnesota Supreme Court was the first state supreme
court to hold that manufacturers have no “duty to train”; manufacturers
need only provide adequate written warnings and instructions. The court
did not provide precedent for its holding. Rather, the court implicitly relied
on, but did not expressly discuss, strong public policy concerns. The court
also provided a second holding, stating in three paragraphs that—contrary
to common law and Minnesota law—a duty in tort may not arise solely
from a contract. This note shows that the history of strict products liability
supports the court’s first holding. However, in reaching this decision, the
court’s second holding overturned well-developed law: undertaking a duty
in negligence by contract. The same reasons underlying that manufacturers
have no “duty to train” parallel and support common law undertakings.
Thus, this decision created dissonance between the purpose and promulga-
tion of products liability law.
INTRODUCTION
In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., the Minnesota Supreme Court
was the first state supreme court to hold that manufacturers1 have no “duty
* B.A., University of Iowa, J.D., University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota).
This article was accepted for publication in May 2013 while the author was a second-year law
student at the University of St. Thomas School of Law.
1. Use of the term “manufacturers” will be used throughout this note to generally include
manufacturers, distributors, and sellers of goods. For a discussion on liability of non-manufactur-
331
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to train.”2 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s second holding then denied re-
covery for tort damages because the parties’ obligations arose from a con-
tract. Although holding that manufacturers have no “duty to train” is
consistent with products liability,3 this note intends to clarify that
Glorvigen’s second holding—that a duty in tort cannot arise from a con-
tract—creates dissonance between the purpose and promulgation of prod-
ucts liability.
To arrive at this conflicting resolution, Glorvigen first framed the
products liability issue as a duty question (viz., a question for the court, not
for a jury).4 By doing so, the court avoided interminable claims against
manufacturers by holding that they have no “duty to train” a user or con-
sumer about safe use of a product; consumers need only receive written
warnings and instructions. However, Glorvigen went awry in its analysis.
The court’s second holding removed tangential duties of manufacturers
with respect to liability for their products by also holding that a duty in tort
cannot arise from a contractual relationship between the consumer and the
manufacturer.5
Plaintiffs in Glorvigen might never have brought a claim against Cir-
rus if not for a contract that explicitly provided for transition training.6 The
Minnesota Supreme Court devoted only three paragraphs to the crux of the
case, holding that a duty in tort cannot arise from a contract. Yet the signifi-
cance of that holding is overshadowed by the first, likely because Minne-
sota is the first state supreme court to hold that manufacturers do not have a
“duty to train”7 consumers.8 Thus, Glorvigen not only fails to fairly limit
ing product resellers, see Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers,
and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213 (1988).
2. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 584 (Minn. 2012).
3. Products liability is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] manufacturer’s or seller’s
tort liability for any damages or injuries suffered by a buyer, user, or bystander as a result of a
defective product.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (3d pocket ed. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998) (“One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise
distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to
persons or property caused by the defect”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
(“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.”) (emphasis added).
4. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 582 (“Duty is a threshold question. . . .”).
5. Id. at 582–84.
6. Id. at 576.
7. The majority holds that manufacturers do not owe a “duty to train” consumers because
“imposition of a duty to train would require an unprecedented expansion of the law.” Id. at 583.
8. See generally PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE: A FIFTY-STATE COMPENDIUM (Mor-
ton F. Daller ed. 2013). However, at least one New York court held sellers of a product do not
have a duty to train. See Adenyinka v. Yankee Fiber Control, Inc., 564 F.Supp. 2d. 265, 285–86
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manufacturers’ liability with its improper second holding, but also discour-
ages manufacturers from ever providing more than written instructions to
consumers by holding that they have no “duty to train.”
This note explores the development of the products liability doctrine
and policy reasons9 in support of holding that manufacturers have no “duty
to train” a consumer. Additionally, this note will show that a duty in tort
can arise solely from a contract and broadly holding otherwise contradicts
these developments and policies. Therefore, the second holding of
Glorvigen should be overturned.
Section I of this note provides a summary of Glorvigen to show the
facts underlying plaintiffs’ claims and the previous rulings that led to its
ultimate disposition. Section II provides background on the development of
products liability and how Minnesota characterizes such claims. Section III
explains a legal duty in Minnesota tort law and how Glorvigen supplanted a
jury’s resolution of a products liability claim by holding that manufacturers
need only provide written instruction; they have no “duty to train.” Section
IV considers policy reasons that likely underlay and support the holding of
no “duty to train.” Section V addresses Glorvigen’s second holding: that a
duty in tort cannot arise solely from a contract—a decision contrary to Min-
nesota and “black letter” law.
I. A SYNOPSIS OF THE GLORVIGEN V. CIRRUS DESIGN
CORPORATION DECISION
Glorvigen involved two fathers who died in a plane crash because one
was a pilot who had not received the necessary training to recover in a
specific emergency situation. In January 2003, Gary Prokop brought his
passenger, James Kosak, along for an attempted flight from Grand Rapids
to St. Cloud, Minnesota to watch their sons play in a hockey game.10 How-
ever, they encountered turbulence soon after takeoff, which ultimately led
to a crash and the death of both Prokop and Kosak.11
Prokop was a licensed pilot who, after two years of experience flying
his Cessna 172 Sky Hawk, purchased a Cirrus SR22 airplane in December
2002.12 The SR22 was a more sophisticated aircraft than the Cessna, having
“several features that [were] uncommon or entirely new to certified general
aviation aircraft,” such as an autopilot function13 and a top speed of 180
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[P]laintiff has failed to cite any case wherein a seller . . . has been found to owe
a duty to train the users . . . and there appears to be an absence of persuasive authority from courts
applying New York law to support existence of such a duty.”).
9. For a greater discussion of policy both for and against strict products liability, see David
G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980).
10. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 578 (both Grand Rapids and St. Cloud are cities in the State of
Minnesota).
11. Id. at 577–78.
12. Id. at 575.
13. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 4 27-MAY-15 10:20
334 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:2
knots.14 Pilots needed special qualifications to fly the SR22, yet “Cirrus
marketed the airplane to ‘pilots with a wide range of experience.’”15
To bridge this gap, Cirrus provided written materials and a training
program for new owners “designed to help already-licensed pilots transition
into flying the SR22.”16 The training entailed a “two-day, new-owner train-
ing program,” referred to as the “Pilot Training Agreement” (“PTA”).17 The
PTA was tailored for already-licensed pilots learning how to fly the SR2218
and intended to transition a pilot from his current airplane to the SR22 by
teaching the pilot about unique features of the SR22.19 According to Cirrus,
the training program was supposed to “build on the pilot’s existing knowl-
edge and experience, by reviewing the systems and procedures of the SR22,
and by paying close attention to those areas that may be new to many pilots
and owners.”20
One of the lessons included in the agreement, Flight Lesson 4a, intro-
duced trained pilots to methods for recovering from a specific emergency
situation—that of inadvertently entering instrument meteorological condi-
tions (“IMC”) from visual flight rules (“VFR”), or “VFR into IMC.”21 VFR
are rules governing flight when conditions allow pilots to fly using only
visual reference rather than reliance on navigation equipment, essentially
“see and be seen.”22 IMC “relates to the flying and navigating of an air-
plane using only instruments.”23 Hence, “VFR into IMC is an emergency
situation in which the pilot loses the ability to see the horizon and must
navigate the airplane through use of instruments alone.”24
“Spatial disorientation caused by VFR into IMC is a leading cause of
small plane crashes. In the SR22, the correct procedure to follow upon en-
tering inadvertent IMC is to activate the autopilot.”25 The PTA stated that
the program would “consist of . . . [a]ircraft systems training with emphasis
on the innovative aspects of the SR22, [including the] . . . autopilot/trim
system.”26 However, Cirrus never provided this “VFR into IMC” lesson to
Prokop.27
14. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d,
816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012).
15. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 576.
16. Id. at 575.
17. Id. at 576.
18. Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 544, aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572.
19. Id.
20. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 576 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 577–78.
22. Visual Flight Rule (Aviation) Definition, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/630843/visual-flight-rule (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
23. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 578, n.5.
24. Id. at 585, n.8 (Anderson, P., J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 577.
26. Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 545, aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572.
27. See Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 578.
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Prokop was “attempting to recover from [VFR into IMC] when he
crashed.”28 Although Prokop was legally licensed to fly in the conditions at
take-off, he inadvertently entered IMC-like conditions.29 This triggered the
crash because Prokop had not been trained to recover when entering condi-
tions that force a pilot flying an SR22 to rely on navigation equipment.30 In
fact, Prokop did not activate the autopilot at all during his flight.31
Cirrus had contracted with the University of North Dakota Aerospace
Foundation (“UNDAF”) Flight School to provide transition training to
SR22 purchasers.32 Yu Weng Shipek was Prokop’s UNDAF flight instruc-
tor who testified that he gave Flight Lesson 4a to Prokop, but failed to
document it.33 “According to the [transition training] syllabus, that omis-
sion indicates that the maneuvers were either skipped or left incomplete at
Shipek’s discretion.”34 Regardless, Shipek provided Prokop with a high-
performance endorsement (valid only in the Cirrus SR22), even though
Flight Lesson 4a—which was to be completed as part of the purchase
agreement—was never administered, meaning Prokop never practiced the
maneuver while flying.35
The director of transition training at the Cirrus facility, John Wahlberg,
testified about VFR into IMC: the autopilot-assisted recovery is “‘the safest
maneuver’ [during VFR into IMC, but that] ‘in order for this training to
take, in order for training to be effective, you can’t just do it on the
ground . . . . It has to be done up in the sky with the pilot.’”36 Wahlberg
also testified that the speed of the SR22 complicates recovery during VFR
into IMC because it requires a “fast response from the pilot,” and if a pilot
is not trained to execute the recovery procedure quickly, he may die.37 Fur-
ther, an expert airplane accident investigator, Captain James M. Walters,
stated that “skipping an in-flight lesson on recovery from VFR into IMC
did not meet industry standards.”38 Walters testified that if “Prokop had
been able to recover during those IMC-like conditions, certainly the acci-
dent would not have happened.”39 In addition, Walters testified to “‘three
root[ ] causes’ of the crash: (1) ‘Prokop made a poor decision [to go fly-
ing],’ (2) ‘Prokop was not given the tools that he needed to make an appro-
28. Id. at 575.
29. Id. at 578–79.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 579.
32. Id. at 576.
33. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 578.
34. Id.
35. Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 546–47, aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572.
36. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 578.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 579.
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priate decision,’ and (3) Prokop was not ‘given the proper tools to be able to
recover from that event.’”40
Prokop was legally licensed to fly at takeoff. However, he did not
know that he needed VFR into IMC in-flight training and was not provided
such training—a severe limitation on his flying abilities in the SR22. It is
likely that without training to recover from VFR into IMC, Prokop did not
know how to respond when he encountered IMC-like conditions. A jury
awarded a total of $19,400,000.00 to the trustees of Prokop and Kosak after
finding that Cirrus, UNDAF, and Prokop were all negligent, and that the
negligence was a direct cause of the crash, apportioning fault among all
negligent parties.41
A divided Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the jury’s award, con-
cluding that Cirrus and UNDAF were not liable as a matter of law.42 The
majority’s reasoning was that Cirrus’s duty to instruct did not include a
duty to provide training and that the negligence claim was barred by the
educational malpractice doctrine.43 In other words, the court of appeals
looked at the issue as though providing Flight Lesson 4a was a duty sepa-
rate from the duty to warn or instruct.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed this decision, stating that
“[t]he duty to warn [or instruct] has never before required a supplier or
manufacturer to provide training, only accurate and thorough instructions
on the safe use of the product, as Cirrus has done here.”44 Further holding
that a duty which “could only have arisen from the contract, [is] . . . not
recover[able] in tort.”45
II. SOME BACKGROUND ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY—
THE FOREGROUND OF GLORVIGEN
Many dangerous products are available to the modern consumer. As
technology advances, consumers may need greater instructions on proper
use of a product or alternatives to services provided.46  Common law has
generally protected consumers (the weaker parties);47 however, the costs of
this protection should have limits. Products liability spreads the increased
40. Id.
41. Id. at 580.
42. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 580.
43. Id. This Note does not discuss the educational malpractice doctrine because the Minne-
sota Supreme Court did not reach this issue. Id. at 584.
44. Id. at 582.
45. Id. at 584.
46. See generally Joffre Swait & Wiktor Adamowicz, The Influence of Task Complexity on
Consumer Choice: A Latent Class Model of Decision Strategy Switching, 28 J. CONSUMER RES.,
135 (2001); Pratibha A. Dabholkar, Consumer Evaluations of New Technology-Based Self-Service
Options: An Investigation of Alternative Models of Service Quality, 13 INT’L J. RES. MKTG. 29
(1996).
47. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
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transaction costs among manufacturers and consumers in order to hold
manufacturers liable for defects in the manufacturing of a product, its de-
sign, or an inadequate warning or instruction of how the consumer should
use the product safely.48 But to what extent are courts willing to hold manu-
facturers accountable if a consumer is harmed?49
Common law historically required privity between parties to determine
whether the manufacturer owed a duty to an injured consumer regarding use
of a product.50 However, common law negligence eventually did away with
this privity requirement.51 While the need for privity was deemed unneces-
sary for product liability claims, common law still recognizes that a duty in
tort may arise from a contract.52 Products liability imposed a duty, regard-
less of privity, onto manufacturers to provide consumers with safe products.
The doctrine of products liability did not abolish duties that arise from priv-
ity of contract; instead, it looked through them.53
Written warnings ensure that a consumer has been put on notice of
improper use of a product whereas written instructions elucidate the proper
manner in which to use a product. Requiring hands-on instructions could
stifle commerce rather than promote it because manufacturers would have
to spread the increased costs of products training among distributors, sell-
ers, and consumers. Prices of products would increase as the amount of
training for a product increased. This economic theory, in combination with
undefined parameters of such a “duty to train,” could lead to a flood of
litigation to determine which products require hands-on instructions, what
48. Peter Nash Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform: Why Virginia Should Adopt the
Henderson-Twerski Proposed Revision of Section 402a, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U.
RICH. L. REV. 857, 861 (1993).
49. “Consideration of the reported cases [regarding liability of manufacturers for defective
products] strongly suggests that the factors defining compliance with minimum standards of con-
sumer use . . . are closely identified with the normal, reasonable expectation patterns of buyers and
sellers . . . . Consideration of the cases also suggests that legally defective products can frustrate
[consumers’] reasonable expectations in several ways.” Reed Dickerson, Products Liability: How
Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 305 (1972).
50. The first major case in the evolution of products liability in Minnesota was Schubert v.
J.R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892); however, courts were cautious to avoid
expanding a manufacturer’s liability, so a manufacturer’s liability was limited to those whom the
product was made for or sold to until 1910 when the court noted that contract was not a limiting
factor: “A duty with respect to instrumentalities delivered under contract may exist towards others
than the contracting parties. That duty extends to all persons likely to be injured by defendant’s
want of care, providing it is reasonable for such person to rely on care having been taken.”
O’Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012, 1013 (1910).
51. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916) (holding
that liability of the manufacturer extended to, but did not go beyond, the ultimate purchaser when
the manufacturer created a defective wheel, sold it to a dealer who then sold it to a consumer, and
the consumer was injured).
52. See generally Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARV. L. REV. 222
(1891).
53. E.g., Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387, 388 (1932) (stating
that “[c]ontract obligation may sometimes be incidental to, but is not the basis of, liability in
tort . . . . The presence of a contract between tortfeasor and third party is incidental only.”).
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the extent of those instructions would be, and what related claims might be
brought by consumers. Glorvigen most likely sought to prevent expanding
products liability beyond the scope of its original intent54 by holding that
manufacturers do not have a “duty to train,” but only a duty to provide
adequate and thorough instructions regarding safe use of a product.55 How-
ever, holding no “duty to train” does not depend upon, or benefit from, also
holding that a duty in tort cannot arise solely from a contract.
With the likely goal of ensuring that manufacturers do not have a
“duty to train,” Glorvigen misconstrued historical developments in tort law
by holding that a duty in tort cannot arise from a contract. To the contrary,
the earliest form of products liability within the tort law of negligence re-
quired privity of contract between an injured party and the manufacturer of
a good.56 It was believed that the manufacturer did not owe a duty to any-
one other than the purchaser of its product and would not be held liable for
use or misuse of the product resulting in injury to others.57 MacPherson
discarded the requirement of privity between consumer and manufacturer in
negligence58 and contract warranty law discarded privity by imposing strict
liability59—which Greenman adopted as a doctrine of products liability.60
The Minnesota Supreme Court “declare[d its] agreement with the principles
underlying the rule of strict tort liability and . . . record[ed its] intention of
applying that rule”61 in products liability cases. Those principles are em-
54. See Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426, 431
(1971) (observing that the purposes of imposing strict liability on defective-product manufacturers
and sellers include promoting “[t]he public interest in safety . . . by discouraging the marketing of
defective products”). The Minnesota Supreme Court has extended a manufacturer’s strict liability
to “retailers and distributors” because “[t]he same policy considerations apply, since both retailers
and manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public.” Farr v. Arm-
strong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64, 72 n.1 (1970). See also Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963) (“The purpose of such liability is to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves.”).
55. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 583. The court noted that “[p]roducts liability is a manufac-
turer’s or seller’s tort liability for any damages or injuries suffered by a buyer, user, or bystander
as a result of a defective product.” Id. at 581.
56. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 867–68 (8th Cir. 1903) (“[T]he
natural and probable effect of the negligence of the contractor or manufacturer will generally be
limited to the party for whom the article is constructed, or to whom it is sold . . . . The limits of the
liability for negligence and for breaches of contract in [products liability cases] are held to be
identical.”).
57. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Loop v.
Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870).
58. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1050.
59. “Liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based
on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (3d
pocket ed. 1996).
60. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 57.
61. McCormack v. Hankscraft Company, 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488, 501 (Minn.
1967).
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bodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), which provides
that a person is liable for “sell[ing] any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer.”62
There is a notable difference between negligence and strict products
liability. Negligence is an obvious form of liability based on fault whereas
strict liability is imposed without fault, or at least without requiring any
proof of fault.63 In other words, as the magnitude of risk occasioned by the
defendant’s activity increases, so does the burden of precautions she must
adopt in order to avoid being found negligent. Strict products liability in
tort, however, merges the contractual concept of implied warranty64 with
the tort concept of negligence.65 Such strict products liability ignores the
precautions a defendant has (or might have) taken and imposes liability
solely for the defendant’s choice of engaging in the activity (viz., designing,
manufacturing, and/or selling the product).
Three products liability claims are available to consumers: (1) manu-
facturing defects, (2) design defects, and (3) failures to warn or instruct.66
Manufacturing defect claims tend to be strict products liability claims while
design defect and failure to warn or instruct claims tend to reside in negli-
gence. This is because the latter involve consumers receiving a product ex-
actly as the manufacturer intended while the former does not.
Manufacturing defects involve products that do not enter the market as
the manufacturer intended (e.g., a faulty gas tank seal that results in a car
explosion because of an error in the manufacturing of the product). When a
manufacturing defect exists, the consumer can compare the defective prod-
uct to that of every other product that was created as the manufacturer in-
tended (e.g., other products created in the same factory). However, design
defects and failure to warn or instruct claims do not allow for such a com-
parison; instead, the product must be compared to some standard of safety
that requires a negligence analysis. Many courts insist on speaking of liabil-
ity due to design defects and inadequate warnings or instructions as being
“strict,” even though both claims rely on a reasonableness test “traditionally
used in determining whether an actor has been negligent.”67 But inadequate
62. Id. at 499 n.15.
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 24 (1998).
64. Implied warranty is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a]n obligation imposed by
the law when there has been no representation or promise; esp., a warranty arising by operation of
law because of the circumstances of a sale, rather than by the seller’s express promise.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 772 (3d pocket ed. 1996).
65. “A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the
circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (1998).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1998).
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warnings or instructions involve foreseeable risks of harm that may be
avoided by the provision of more accurate and thorough warnings and in-
structions.68 Here is my rule of thumb: when a manufacturer cannot design
the danger out of its product, then the manufacturer should warn consumers
of that danger and/or instruct consumers as to proper and safe use of the
product.
Products liability is intended to push costs of defective products onto
the manufacturers rather than the injured consumers.69 There are many pol-
icy arguments for imputing a duty onto manufacturers in products liability
actions, which mainly deal with protection of the consumer and a balance of
that protection against the needs of the product manufacturer.70
Primarily, strict liability is imposed on manufacturers to spread the
losses due to defective products.71 This drives prices up for consumers so
that manufacturers can pay for losses or insure against them.72 While tort
liability increases costs of products, business competition drives them
down. Therefore, products liability induces manufacturers to take greater
safety precautions and market safer products.73 Nevertheless, modern prod-
ucts inevitably result in injuries, which can have a devastating effect on the
individual consumer.74 And consumers are at a disadvantage if they must
prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer because of their limited
resources. Hence, the consumers should be protected from “unknown, latent
dangers in products.”75
Today most states have adopted either the Restatement (Second) of
Torts or another version of strict products liability.76 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 402A does not expressly refer to failure to warn in products
liability; however, comment j to § 402A suggests that “the seller may be
required to give directions or warning” except when “the danger, or potenti-
ality of danger, is generally known and recognized.”77
68. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 582; See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
69. Companies generally seek to achieve “economies of scale”—i.e., as production increases,
the costs of producing decrease for manufacturers; however, the Henry Ford assembly line model
inevitably results in defects, and it makes sense to hold the manufacturer liable for such defects.
For a discussion on economies of scale see Economies of Scale and Scope, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
20, 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/12446567.
70. Swisher, supra note 48, at 861.
71. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63 (1963).
72. Swisher, supra note .48, at 861.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 862.
76. See Michael A. Pittenger, Note, Reformulating the Strict Liability Failure to Warn, 49
WASH & LEE L. REV. 1509, 1514 n.32 (1992) (noting that “[t]hirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia recognize the Restatement’s version of strict products liability[; s]even states and Pu-
erto Rico recognize other variations[;] Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina and
Virginia have not yet recognized strict products liability”).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 11 27-MAY-15 10:20
2014] IT’S A BIRD, IT’S A PLANE! 341
It has been noted that[,] notwithstanding the fact that there is no
cross-reference from § 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d
(which sets out the strict tort liability doctrine) to § 388 of the
Restatement of Torts 2d (which spells out the duty to warn in
negligence actions), the principles applicable in the latter should
be applicable to the former.78
Even though § 402A does not expressly address failure to warn in
products liability, the Restatement (Third) does do so with inclusion of neg-
ligence language.79
So how did failure to warn or instruct claims evolve into a combina-
tion of negligence and strict liability? Failure to warn or instruct claims
derive mainly from negligence in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 388.80 Section 388 provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by
the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier[:]
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to
be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its danger-
ous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous.81
The determination of whether a failure to warn or instruct claim
sounds in negligence or strict liability can be extremely difficult.82
In an attempt to avoid this difficulty, Minnesota courts analyze strict
products liability failure to warn claims in the same manner as negligence
failure to warn claims: “As a practical matter, where the strict liability claim
is based on . . . failure to warn . . . there is essentially no difference between
78. Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Failure to Warn as Basis of Liability Under Doctrine of
Strict Liability in Tort, 53 A.L.R.3d 239 § 2[b] (originally published in 1973).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (“A product is defec-
tive when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in
design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product . . . (c) is defec-
tive because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribu-
tion, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.”).
80. M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89
W. VA. L. REV. 221, 231 (1987).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1976).
82. Douglas R. Richmond, Products Liability: Corporate Successors and the Duty to Warn,
45 BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 540 (1993).
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strict liability and negligence,”83 because failure to warn or instruct claims
are based on a concept of negligence.84 “The distinction between strict lia-
bility and negligence in design-defect and failure-to-warn cases [in Minne-
sota] is that in strict liability, knowledge of the condition of the product and
the risks involved in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer,
whereas in negligence these elements must be proven.”85
Regardless of whether a failure to warn claim sounds in negligence or
strict liability, “duty to warn is the most widely-employed claim or theory
in products liability litigation today.”86 There are several important reasons
for this:
First, failure to warn theories are less technical and expensive to
prosecute than traditional design defect cases. Second, but related
to the first, is a widespread recognition that almost all products
capable of causing injuries could be made less hazardous by con-
veying effective warnings or instructions to users. Finally, a man-
ufacturer’s breach of its alleged duty to warn can be pursued
under three theories: negligence, strict liability, and breach of im-
plied warranty.87
In Minnesota, a failure to warn or instruct claim can be stated as one
for strict liability or for negligence, but the plaintiff must submit their case
to the jury on only one theory.88 For example, the plaintiffs in Glorvigen
83. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Minn. 1982). A handful of other
jurisdictions have held similarly:
See, e.g., Russell v. G.A.F., 422 A.2d 989, 991 (D.C. 1980) (concluding that both strict
liability and negligent failure to warn impose a duty of ordinary care); Bernier v.
Raymark Ind., Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 540 (Me. 1986) (explaining that strict liability failure
to warn resembles negligence because the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct is
a critical issue under each); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d 476, 480
(Mich. 1979) (holding that when liability turns on adequacy of warning, the issue is one
of reasonable care regardless of the theory pleaded); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432
N.E.2d 814, 818 n.5 (Ohio 1982) (noting that a rule imposing an obligation on a seller to
give adequate warning is a rule fixing the standard of care, regardless of whether the tort
is labeled strict liability) (quoting Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267, 273
(Ohio 1977)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
Pittenger, supra note 76, at 1518 n.49. Cf. Florida adopted the California Supreme Court’s lan-
guage in separating failure to warn in strict liability from failure to warn in negligence:
Failure to warn in strict liability differs markedly from failure to warn in the negligence
context. Negligence law in a failure to warn case requires a plaintiff to prove that a
manufacturer or distributor did not warn of a particular risk for reasons that fell below
the acceptable standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
have known and warned about. Strict liability is not concerned with a standard of due
care or the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct. The rules of strict liability re-
quire a plaintiff to prove only that the defendant did not adequately warn of a particular
risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best
scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution.
Ferayorni v. Hyundai Motor Co., 711 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1998) (citing Anderson
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 558–59 (Cal. 1991)).
84. Westerberg v. School District No. 792, 148 N.W.2d 312, 316–18 (Minn. 1967).
85. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984).
86. Richmond, supra note 82, at 535.
87. Id. at 537.
88. Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 1984).
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brought a failure to instruct products liability claim under a theory of negli-
gence and the jury apportioned 25 percent liability to the pilot and 75 per-
cent liability to Cirrus and UNDAF.89
Strict products liability imputes a duty on the manufacturer without
reference to any contract, thereby doing away with any privity requirement.
Without a privity requirement, common law negligence acknowledges that
a duty in tort may arise from either a manufacturer’s failure to instruct or by
a party undertaking a duty via contract.90 But for a consumer to win a negli-
gence action, the manufacturer must—first and foremost—have owed her a
legal duty.91
III. LEGAL DUTIES ARE DETERMINED BY THE COURTS
When liability is based on a theory of negligence, “a plaintiff must
prove (1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an
injury, and (4) that the breach of the duty of care was a proximate cause of
the injury.”92 Duty is a threshold question in Minnesota,93 and Minnesota
courts consider negligence law on a supplier’s duty to warn to be “well
developed[:] . . . . In general, a supplier has a duty to warn end users of a
dangerous product if it is reasonably foreseeable that an injury could occur
in its use.”94 “If no duty exists, a court need not reach the remaining ele-
ments of a negligence claim.”95
In Glorvigen, no party disputed that Cirrus had a duty to warn, includ-
ing a “‘duty to give adequate instructions’ on the safe use of Cirrus air-
planes to foreseeable users.”96 A manufacturer has a duty not only to warn
of danger but also to provide adequate instructions for safe use of its prod-
uct.97 “In the case of extremely dangerous products, the supplier may be
required to go to considerable lengths to inform the required persons of
danger.”98 Minnesota’s jury instructions provide the framework for deter-
mining the adequacy of a product usage instruction:
A manufacturer must keep up with scientific knowledge and ad-
vances in the field.
A manufacturer’s duty to provide reasonably adequate (warnings)
(instructions) must be judged according to the scientific knowl-
89. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 580.
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 (1998).
91. See infra § III.
92. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011).
93. Id.
94. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004).
95. Kellogg v. Finnegan, 823 N.W.2d 454, 458 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
96. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 572.
97. Harmon Contract Glazing, Inc. v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 493 N.W.2d 146, 151 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
98. Korpela, supra note 78 § 2[a].
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edge and advances that existed at the time the product was
designed.
In deciding whether the manufacturer’s (warnings) (instructions)
were reasonably adequate, consider all the facts and circum-
stances, including, among others:
1. The likelihood that harm would result from use of the product,
2. The seriousness of the harm that would result,
3. The cost and ease of providing (warnings) (instructions) that
would avoid the harm,
4. Whether the (warnings) (instructions) are in a form the ordi-
nary user could reasonably be expected to notice and understand,
5. Whether the manufacturer considered the scientific knowledge
and advances in the field,
6. [Other factors].
A product that is not accompanied by reasonably adequate (warn-
ings) (instructions) is unreasonably dangerous to whoever uses or
is affected by the product. The product must be reasonably safe
for use if the (warnings) (instructions) are followed.99
According to the Glorvigen jury, Cirrus and UNDAF breached their
duty to provide adequate instructions. Despite this conclusion, the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals reframed the issue by removing the determination of
whether Cirrus’s instruction was adequate from the jury and, instead, ana-
lyzed the instruction itself as a matter of law. Put simply, the court of ap-
peals looked at the issue as though providing Flight Lesson 4a was a duty
separate from the duty to warn or instruct (under both products liability and
common law negligence).
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded “that Cirrus’s
duty to warn did not require Cirrus to provide Flight Lesson 4a100 . . . .
Indeed, imposing a duty to train would be wholly unprecedented.”101 The
Minnesota Supreme Court arrived at its conclusion by stating that the appel-
lants were unable to cite any case law that included an obligation of a man-
ufacturer to “provide training in order to discharge its duty to warn.”102
Further, Glorvigen announced that Cirrus adequately discharged its
duty to warn by providing written instructions as required under Minnesota
law.103 Since “imposition of a duty to train would require an unprecedented
expansion of law,” the court held that “Cirrus did not owe a duty to train
Prokop.”104 This reasoning suggests that, under Minnesota law, a manufac-
turer discharges its duty to warn by handing over a booklet, regardless of
any consideration for hands-on instructions. Precedent does not support im-
99. 4A Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides–Civil CIVJIG 75.25 (5th ed.).
100. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 582–83.
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position of a “duty to train,” and not imposing such is strongly supported by
public policy concerns, even though the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
explicitly enumerate them.
Even though Cirrus knew it was manufacturing a dangerous product
and acknowledged this by providing transitional training to instruct pilots
on the complexity of its product, Glorvigen chose to address the adequacy
of the instruction (i.e., whether Cirrus breached its duty) rather than leave
this determination to the jury because the existence of a duty is a matter of
law. Although Glorvigen’s first holding was proper, reaching it in this man-
ner conflicts with Minnesota precedent of allowing the jury, not the court,
to determine how and in what form such product instructions should be
conveyed to consumers.105
Although the existence of “a duty is a legal question for court resolu-
tion,” the “adequacy of the warning” should “remain for jury resolution.”106
The jury in Glorvigen decided that the nature of the SR22 required hands-
on instructions. Minnesota law mandates that a jury’s verdict is not to be
disturbed unless it cannot “be sustained on any reasonable theory of the
evidence.”107
Considering all of the evidence (e.g., the expert who testified that ade-
quate instructions to operate a Cirrus SR22, according to industry stan-
dard,108 required training be conducted up in the sky with the pilot in order
to be effective) it is difficult to say that the Glorvigen jury’s verdict was not
well-supported by the evidence. The SR22 is a very fast, highly dangerous
aircraft. Cirrus recognized this and provided transition training with the
purchase of an SR22.109 Regardless of what written materials Prokop re-
ceived, experts said that the training needed to be done in the air. Flight
Lesson 4a included VFR into IMC training as part of the overall transition
training, and it was not administered. The purpose of the jury instructions is
to allow a case-by-case resolution as to whether the warning or instruction
is adequate. As the Glorvigen dissent stated, “[f]ar from imposing a new
duty to train on suppliers, the jury in this case simply determined that a
supplier of a dangerous product must provide a warning commensurate with
that danger to consumers, as required under our case law.”110
But courts have always been free “to declare that the facts are such that
no reasonable jury could find otherwise. That’s not a no-duty ruling; that is
105. Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987).
106. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924–25 (Minn. 1986).
107. Pouliot v. Fitzsimmons, 582 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Minn. 1998).
108. Industry standard alone may not be sufficient to determine whether a defendant was neg-
ligent, but Minnesota has recognized that juries are to consider “the customs and practices of the
trade.” See Broughton V. Curran v. Nielsen Co., 287 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1979).
109. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 576.
110. Id. at 587 (Anderson, P., J., dissenting).
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a ruling that, as a matter of law, there is no negligence because no reasona-
ble jury could find otherwise.”111
“Sometimes policy considerations will counsel against the imposition
of a duty, even if the injury is foreseeable.”112 The logical question is
whether adequacy of an instruction, which requires hands-on instructions
amounts to imposing a new “duty to train.” Germann set forth the standard
for determining whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn or instruct.113
The standard is foreseeability: if the circumstance causing damage is direct
and is the type of occurrence that was or should have been reasonably fore-
seeable when looking back to the alleged negligent act, a court should hold
that, as a matter of law, a duty exists.114 Rather than affirm a jury’s determi-
nation that a duty to instruct may entail hands-on instructions, Glorvigen
looked back to the negligent act and determined that a “duty to train” does
not exist, most likely because of the underlying policy considerations.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING THE MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING THAT MANUFACTURERS DO NOT
HAVE A “DUTY TO TRAIN” CONSUMERS
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not provide any reasoning for hold-
ing that manufacturers have no “duty to train,” aside from noting the lack of
case law supporting such a proposition.115 As the first state supreme court
to hold that manufacturers do not have a “duty to train” but only to provide
written instructions, it was incumbent upon the Minnesota Supreme Court
to explain its holding. Unfortunately, Glorvigen left many questions unan-
swered for consumers. For example, is the harm from holding that manufac-
turers have no “duty to train” much greater to the individual consumer than
it may be to the manufacturers to whom juries extend this obligation? If a
manufacturer is only required to provide written instructions, will call-
center help-lines cease to exist?116 Who can a consumer rely on to provide
training, and what duty will that provider have? Even though the court
chose not to address these questions, if the majority had held that manufac-
turers have a “duty to train,” a greater number of questions for manufactur-
ers and the court would have arisen.117
111. Michael D. Green, Symposium, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: Understand-
ing the Third Restatement of Torts, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2011).
112. Mike Steenson, Recent Development in Minnesota Negligence Law: The Domagala Di-
lemma-Domagala v. Rolland, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 633, 633 (2013).
113. Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924 (Minn. 1986).
114. Id.
115. See Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 583.
116. This outcome is not very likely considering that the market still determines many expec-
tations that consumers have and manufacturers must meet. For a discussion on markets setting
standards, see Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819 (1992).
117. Discussed infra pp. 20–24.
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Although Glorvigen did not enumerate policy reasons, three in particu-
lar support its decision that manufacturers have no “duty to train”: (1) to
promote trade rather than stifle it by increasing transaction costs118  further
than products liability already has; (2) to avoid a flood of litigation119 re-
garding what products would require hands-on instructions, what the extent
of those instructions would be, and possible related claims; and (3) to keep
factors such as consumer idiosyncrasies, intelligence levels, and fallacies
out of a products liability claim.120
The first policy involves economic considerations. Rather than in-
crease transaction costs, Glorvigen (and our economy) seeks to promote
free trade. Consumers can purchase any number of dangerous, life-threaten-
ing products. As long as the product contains no manufacturing or design
defects, the manufacturer need only provide adequate warnings or instruc-
tions via materials the consumer can access at any time (i.e., written warn-
ings or instructions). Failure to warn or instruct claims are the most
common in products liability; requiring more than written instructions from
manufacturers would exponentially increase transaction costs and liability
for manufacturers, increasing prices across the entire market.121
The second policy consideration is the most obvious: myriad lawsuits
could have been brought by plaintiffs relying on Glorvigen and claiming
that manufacturers have a “duty to train.” Since the jury instructions pro-
vide factors for determining whether a warning or instruction was adequate,
a jury could find hands-on instructions necessary for products not nearly as
dangerous or complex as the SR22.122 In Glorvigen, only Flight Lesson 4a
118. Manufacturers are creating ever-increasing complex products and have been supplement-
ing written warnings and instructions that accompany these products. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
Products Liability Advisory Council, Inc. at *16; Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d
572, 576 (Minn. 2012) (No. A10-1242, A10-1243, A10-1246, A10-1247) 2011 WL 9518489, at
*16–17.
If a duty to train is imposed upon product manufacturers and sellers, such companies
will be forced to respond in a variety of ways, such as: (1) stop offering complicated
products that a reasonable person may have trouble safely using with reference to the
written warnings and instructions alone; (2) stop offering supplemental training regard-
ing such products; or (3) raise the price of such complicated products to offset the in-
creased training costs and inevitable liability risks. . . . [i]mposition of a duty to train
will hamper economic activity in Minnesota as the increased prices will lower demand
and thus sales of complicated products.
Id. at *16–17.
119. Id. at *17 (“The imposition of a duty to train under Minnesota product liability law will
cause a flood of litigation and dramatically alter product manufacturers’ and sellers’ costs of doing
business in Minnesota.”).
120. Id. at *17–18 (“Of what significance is the existence of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme already in existence establishing the amount of training and the competence of operators
of the equipment?”).
121. Nash, supra note 48, at 861.
122. The dissent notes that the majority accepted an argument by Cirrus and amici that if the
court were to hold “that Cirrus was obligated to provide Flight Lesson 4a in order to adequately
discharge its duty to warn, then all suppliers—even suppliers of coffee pots, according to state-
ments made during oral arguments—will be required to provide training to their users.” Yet,
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was in dispute. However, the extent of training would also open a door to
subsequent litigation. Each product would be different and the training may
require anywhere from minutes to days of training, such as with the
SR22.123 This training may be considered “post-sale”124 instructions, re-
quiring a significant investment on the part of the manufacturer beyond
providing a safe product. In fact, if the consumer needed to return to prem-
ises owned by the manufacturer, this might expose the manufacturer to even
greater costs and additional liability. The training could also require use of
property other than where the product is manufactured or sold, requiring
additional expenses and insulations from liability. Regardless, the manufac-
turer would face a greater probability of potential claims on its premises,
especially if the product is very dangerous. Additionally, the cost of finding
reliable instructors would continually rise as more products are found to
require hands-on instructions.125 While worrying about the competency of
their instructors, manufacturers would also have to consider the competency
of each individual consumer.
The third policy consideration seeks to avoid such levels of adequate
hands-on instructions for each individual consumer.126 While each product
may require a different amount of instruction, each consumer would also
require a different amount to ensure the instructions were adequate and
thorough. A portion of this would be attributable to the consumer’s negli-
gence if an accident were to occur. However, Minnesota is a comparative
fault state,127 meaning the manufacturer could still be held liable. Any in-
“[t]his argument overreacts to the scope and impact of such a holding.” Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at
586 (Anderson, P. J., dissenting).
123. See Brief and Addendum of Respondent-Appellee at *35, Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design
Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Minn. 2012) (No. A10-1242, A10-1243, A10-1246, A10-1247)
2011 WL 9518487 at *35 (“The duty to train . . . would be almost boundless.”).
124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10 (1998). For a greater
discussion on manufacturers’ post-sale warnings, see M. Stuart Madden, Modern Post-Sale Warn-
ings and Related Obligations (Pace Law Faculty Publications, Paper 142, 2000), available at
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1141&context=lawfaculty; See also
Douglas R. Richmond, Expanding Products Liability: Manufacturers’ Post-Sale Duties to Warn,
Retrofit and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 7 (1999).
125. See Brief and Addendum of Amicus Curiae Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association at 12
Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) aff’d, 816 N.W.2d
572 (Minn. 2012) (Nos. A10-1242, A10-1243, A10-1246, A10-1247), 2010 WL 8903390 at *12
(“Loss of available flight training providers will ensue [and] . . . with the uncertainty [of what a
“duty to train” includes], costs are also likely to increase, thus reducing the availability of
training.”).
126. The court could impose a limit on the duty to train. A California court reasoned that “[a]
flight school, like a driving school, cannot anticipate and train for every possible hazardous situa-
tion. Having adequately trained [a pilot] to the point where he obtained his pilot’s license, [a
manufacturer’s] duty to train should terminate at that point.” Hubbard v. Pac. Flight Servs., Inc.,
(Nos. C046617, C047093) 2005 WL 2739818, at *10 (Cal. App. 3d Oct. 25, 2005).
127. Minn. Stat. § 604.01 (2012). For a discussion on the issues wrapped up in comparative
fault apportionment between manufacturers and consumers in strict products liability cases, see
Jon D. Jensvold, Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability
Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1974).
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struction requires a level of understanding and some consumers may take
more time to reach an adequate level.128
The failure to warn or instruct claim in Glorvigen provided a difficult
decision for the court: allow jury discretion as to the adequacy of an instruc-
tion or bypass the jury by holding that, as a matter of law, manufacturers do
not have a “duty to train.” Choosing the latter route, Glorvigen was the first
state supreme court case to establish a true ceiling on the duty to provide
adequate warnings or instructions. Essentially, the court established that
manufacturers are only required to provide accurate and thorough written
instructions; if hands-on instructions are required for the product, such re-
sponsibility is in the hands of the consumer.129
Plaintiffs’ claim in Glorvigen might never have been brought if not for
a contract between Prokop and Cirrus that provided for transition training.
With such an obvious agreement to provide hands-on training, it seemed
logical that Cirrus breached its duty to provide adequate instructions when
it failed to fulfill its promise to Prokop. And, while the facts of this case
lend credence to allowing recovery for plaintiffs on a failure to instruct
claim, the underlying public policy reasons weigh heavily against recovery
on those grounds.
The contract brought to surface the products liability failure to warn or
instruct claim, but it also provided another common law route to recovery:
plaintiffs could alternatively claim the duty was found in the contract itself
and Cirrus negligently performed its undertaking to render services.
By focusing on establishing a ceiling in failure to warn or instruct
claims, Glorvigen’s tunnel vision overruled nearly a decade of law estab-
lishing that a duty in tort may arise from contract. However, this improper
second holding was overshadowed by the proper first holding of no “duty to
train.” If a manufacturer does not have a “duty to train” and consumers are
not able to hold the manufacturer or anyone else liable through contract, the
possibility of recovery for any resulting personal injury is nonexistent. This
holding not only conflicts with nearly fifty years of black letter law,130 it
ignores the fact that allowing a duty in tort to arise from a party’s contract
gives the parties discretion as to the extent of this liability—a result that
favors and aligns with the policy reasons behind holding that manufacturers
have no “duty to train.”
128. See Brief and Addendum of Amicus Curiae Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association at 13
Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) aff’d, 816 N.W.2d
572 (Minn. 2012) (Nos. A10-1242, A10-1243, A10-1246, A10-1247), 2010 WL 8903390 at *13
(“A pilot who meets proficiency standards one day, may not be able to fly to those same standards
the next. There is no way to deny this very human element when trying to assign liability or fault
when things go wrong after training ends.”).
129. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 572–81.
130. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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V. COMMON LAW UNDERTAKINGS: WHERE GLORVIGEN WAS WRONG
The Glorvigen majority only devoted three paragraphs to its second
holding: that a duty in tort cannot arise solely from a contract.131 This runs
contrary to both black letter common law and Minnesota law. To under-
stand why this holding is flawed, a few things must be put into context: (1)
Minnesota has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, Negligent
Performance of Undertaking to Render Services;132 (2) Minnesota case law
allows recovery in tort when parties have a contractual relationship and a
personal injury occurs;133 and (3) most important is the economic loss doc-
trine.134 Minnesota’s legislature amended Minnesota Statutes section
604.101 in the year 2000 to allow recovery in tort only when personal in-
jury results from a contractual relationship.135
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 Negligent Performance of
Undertaking to Render Services provides that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability
131. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 583–84.
132. See Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 674 (Minn. 2001); State v.
Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493–94 (Minn. 1996). See also Reedon of Faribault, Inc. v.
Fidelity and Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Minn. 1988) (acknowledging
that a duty may arise under a contract to render services but holding that Fidelity did not contract
into such services, explicitly stating, “[Fidelity] only owes a duty if it undertook ‘to render ser-
vices’ to respondent.”).
133. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. “Minnesota has long recognized that
‘one who voluntarily assumes a duty must exercise reasonable care or he will be responsible for
damages resulting from his failure to do so.’” Ironwood Springs Christian Ranch, Inc. v. Walk to
Emmaus, 801 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288,
295, 232 N.W.2d 818, 821–22 (1975); Williams v. Harris, 518 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (“Minnesota recognizes that, even though there is no duty in the first instance, if a person
voluntarily assumes a duty, the duty must be performed with reasonable care or the person will be
liable for damages.”), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1994).
134. See Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn. 1990) (finding “no tort liability
for the damage to the potato crop grown with the defective seed” where the recovery is one solely
for “economic loss”), superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 604.10(a) (2012), as stated in Kietzer
v. Land O’Lakes, (No. C1-01-1334), 2002 WL 233746, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002). See
also Minn. Stat. § 604.10(a):
Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods that is due to damage to tangible property
other than the goods sold may be recovered in tort as well as in contract, but economic
loss that arises from a sale of goods between parties who are each merchants in goods of
the kind is not recoverable in tort[;]
MINN. STAT. § 604.101, subd. 3 (2012) (“A buyer may not bring a product defect tort claim
against a seller for compensatory damages unless a defect in the goods sold or leased caused harm
to the buyer’s tangible personal property other than the goods or to the buyer’s real property.”).
135. Minn. Stat. § 604.101 (2012) (“This section does not apply to claims for injury to the
person.”) For a greater discussion on the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota, see Daniel S.
Kleinberger, Linda J. Rusch, et. al., Building a New Foundation: Torts, Contracts, and the Eco-
nomic Loss Doctrine, MINNESOTA BENCH AND BAR, Sept. 2000, available at http://www.mnbar
.org/benchandbar/2000/sep00/econ-loss.htm.
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to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exer-
cise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if:
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the
undertaking.136
The application of § 323 is broad and Minnesota had not applied it in
narrow circumstances such as Glorvigen. The scarcity of such “sufficient
decisions” led Minnesota to move in a direction opposite to that of the Re-
statements.137 Comment d to § 323 states that “there is no essential reason
why the breach of a promise which has induced reliance and so caused
harm should not be actionable in tort [especially] . . . where the harm is
physical.”138 The comment also notes “[t]he technicalities to which the
courts have resorted in finding some commencement of performance indi-
cate a development of law toward such liability. In the absence of sufficient
decisions, however, the question is left open.”139
The Restatement (Third) of Torts § 42, Duty Based on Undertaking,
reiterates the rule in § 323 and provides strong suggestions that states
should acknowledge a duty in tort arising out of a contract:
An actor who undertakes to render services to another that the
actor knows or should know reduce the risk of physical harm to
the other has a duty of reasonable care to the other in conducting
the undertaking if:
(a) the failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm
beyond that which existed without the undertaking, or
(b) the person to whom the services are rendered or another relies
on the actor’s exercising reasonable care in the undertaking.140
Comment d to § 42 defines an undertaking as one that “entails an actor
voluntarily rendering services, gratuitously or pursuant to a contract, on be-
half of another.”141 The Restatement (Third) of Torts § 42 cleared up what
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. d (1965) notes that:
Decisions in a number of jurisdictions, holding that the breach of a promise can give rise
only to a contract action, and does not result in liability in tort, have not been overruled.
The modern law has, however, witnessed a considerable weakening and blurring of the
distinction, in situations where the plaintiff’s reliance upon the defendant’s promise has
resulted in harm to him. Through the development of the doctrine of ‘promissory estop-
pel’ the contract rule itself has been considerably modified to permit, in many situations,
the enforcement of a promise made without consideration.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. d (1965).
139. Id.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42
(1998).
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42
cmt. d (1998). Comment d further states that “[t]he actor need not act for the purpose of protecting
the other; this Section is equally applicable to those who act altruistically and to those who act
nonaltruistically, as is often the case when an undertaking is a result of a contractual agreement.”
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 left unclear for courts: whether a duty
could arise in tort solely from a contract.
If contract law provides a remedy for mere promises, tort law
should also do so when breach of the promise causes personal
injury or property damage. The crux of a duty based on a promise
is that the actor engage in behavior that leads another person to
forgo available alternatives for protection. Whether that behavior
consists of action or a promise should not matter.142
Hence, the common law recognizes a duty in tort arising solely from a
contract. This makes perfect sense, given that the common law of torts orig-
inally required parties to be in privity of contract and removed this require-
ment to expand liability, not to reduce it.143
What is considered a “sufficient decision” for this analysis, though? In
1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Walsh v. Pagra Air Taxi,
Inc.144 that a fixed base operator (“FBO”) at a city airport was liable for
breach of a tort duty that the FBO assumed through its operating agreement
with the city (a contract). In 2005, the Minnesota Court of Appeals sent the
question of whether a caretaker at a day care service was liable for the death
of an infant to a jury because the caretaker could have “created a special
relationship with the [infant] even without having previously accepted her
entrustment”145 through contract.
Yet, the majority in Glorvigen relies on the “fundamental difference[s]
between tort and contract.”146 These fundamental differences link back to a
1917 case called Keiper v. Anderson which held that a wrongful death ac-
tion could not be brought by the estate of a deceased tenant when the land-
lord’s failure to heat the premises led to death of the tenant.147 The Keiper
court said that, “[h]ad Keiper survived, his cause of action would have been
for breach of contract to heat the premises, as proof of the contract would
have been necessary to create any cause of action.”148 However, Keiper
also recognized that sub-lessees of the tenant, members of tenant’s family,
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42
cmt. e (1998) (emphasis added).
143. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (articulating that contractual obligations
can give rise to duties in tort). See also Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Ex. 1842) (limiting liability of suppliers of goods and services to parties with whom they had
contractual relationships). The requirement of privity was then abolished. See Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (recognizing that not every duty arising out of contract must
be limited to parties in privity).
144. Walsh v. Pagra Air Taxi, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 567, 570–71 (Minn. 1979). See also Paul v.
Faricy, 37 N.W.2d 427, 436 (Minn. 1949) (suggesting that a city that enters a maintenance con-
tract with the state may be liable for injuries resulting from negligence in maintenance).
145. Laska v. Anoka Cnty., 696 N.W.2d 133, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added).
146. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 92,
at 613 (4th ed. 1971)).
147. Keiper v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, 165 N.W. 237, 238 (Minn. 1917).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 23 27-MAY-15 10:20
2014] IT’S A BIRD, IT’S A PLANE! 353
and employees of the tenant could recover from a landlord because “[t]he
liability of the landlord was in each case based on his negligence.”149 Put
simply, do not form a contract if you might incur injury to your person or
property if you want to recover any damages. William Prosser and Werdner
Keeton once suggested that “it’s cheaper to kill a man than to maim
him,”150 and apparently the Minnesota Supreme Court has not corrected
this old adage. Contracts absolve a party from liability for a negligent act,
limiting damages to breach of contract even when death results from such
an act.151
Is the Minnesota Supreme Court suggesting that it may be more
favorable for the plaintiff to not have a contract in the happenstance an
injury results? If so, perhaps couch surfing152 has become more than a trav-
eler’s inexpensive way to explore the world.
Keiper is no longer applicable law. Yet Glorvigen relied on this cen-
tury-old case, irrespective of Minnesota’s subsequent adoption of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 323, the economic loss doctrine, and case law
allowing recovery when bodily or property damage results from negligent
performance of a duty undertaken by a contract.153 The products liability
action in this case should have turned the majority’s attention to well-settled
principles in tort law that products liability brought to light.154
Even before Keiper, the common law acknowledged that to create a
duty, “no consideration need be shown, since no contract is necessary. As a
matter of fact, entrance into such a relationship is often the occasion of a
contract. . . . [E]ven in [those] cases the terms of the contract seldom em-
brace the whole transaction.”155 As the Glorvigen dissent noted, “[i]t should
be self-evident that a party who breaches a contract ought to be liable for
the breach of that contract. But a party should not be ‘immunize[d] . . . from
tort liability for his wrongful acts’ just because those acts ‘grow out of’ or
are ‘coincident’ to a contract.”156
The majority’s reliance on the “fundamental differences between tort
and contract” misstates the issue. Prokop and Kosak died as a result of
149. Id.
150. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 945 (5th ed.
1984).
151. Minnesota has recognized some forms of recovery for tenants when damage to person or
property results from a landlord’s negligence. For a greater discussion on the development of
landlord-tenant laws in Minnesota, see Lawrence R. McDonough, Still Crazy After All These
Years: Landlords and Tenants and the Law of Torts, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 427 (2006).
152. See Cody Kittle, Adventures in Couch Surfing: One Sojourner’s Truth, TIME, Feb. 15,
2011, available at http://www.time.com/time/travel/article/0,31542,2045092,00.html.
153. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
154. Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 243 N.W. 387, 388 (Minn. 1932) (“The presence of a
contract between tortfeasor and third party is incidental only.”).
155. Beale, supra note 52, at 222.
156. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 589 (Anderson, P., J., dissenting) (citing Eads v. Marks, 39
Cal.2d 807, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952)).
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Cirrus’s and UNDAF’s negligence. The fact that personal injuries (death)
resulted from that negligence is why the claim was brought—to recover for
noneconomic losses. The term “economic loss” is meant to describe losses
resulting from product defects that are not recoverable in a typical tort ac-
tion; however, the economic loss doctrine does not bar tort claims for all
economic losses.157 The very purpose of the doctrine is to “preserve[ ] the
boundary between tort and contract law.”158
The Glorvigen majority cites a case involving the economic loss doc-
trine to support its holding:
Tort actions and contract actions protect different interests.
Through a tort action, the duty of certain conduct is imposed by
law and not necessarily by the will or intention of the parties. The
duty may be owed to all those within the range of harm, or to a
particular class of people. On the other hand, contract actions pro-
tect the interests in having promises performed. Contract obliga-
tions are imposed because of conduct of the parties manifesting
consent, and are owed only to the specific parties named in the
contract.159
This not only fails to address the purpose behind the economic loss
doctrine, it fails to accurately portray 80 South Eighth Street Ltd. Partner-
ship: “[E]conomic losses that arise out of commercial transactions, except
those involving personal injury or damage to other property, are not recov-
erable under the tort theories of negligence or strict products liability.”160
This well-developed rule in Minnesota161 stands for the position that when
personal injury or damage to other property is involved, a tort duty will
emanate from a contract and tort damages will be allowed.
The Glorvigen majority ignored this distinction by focusing on its first
holding that limited a manufacturer’s liability for consumers’ potential fail-
ure to warn or instruct claims. By first holding that there is no “duty to
train,” the gravamen162 of the plaintiffs’ claim—negligence—was
whitewashed.163 Even though plaintiffs only asserted tort claims, the major-
157. See, e.g., Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 399 (Minn. 1977) (loss of
consortium); Horvath v. Liquid Controls Corp., 455 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(wrongful death).
158. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 572 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
159. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. P’ship v. Carey-Canada,
Inc., 486 N.W. 2d 393, 395–96) (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
161. See generally Cortney G. Sylvester, Economic Loss: Commercial Contract Law Lives, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417 (2000); Jacquelyn K. Brunmeier, Death by Footnote: The Life and
Times of Minnesota’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 871 (1993).
162. Gravamen is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the “substantial point or essence of a
claim, grievance, or complaint.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (3d pocket ed. 1996).
163. The Minnesota Court of Appeals explicitly stated that “[t]he gravamen of respondents’
claims is that appellants breached their duty to provide adequate flight training by omitting Flight
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ity stated that, “[w]hen a contract provides the only source of duties be-
tween the parties, Minnesota law does not permit the breach of those duties
to support a cause of action in negligence.”164 However, Lesmeister in-
volved purely economic losses without any personal injury:165 the “grava-
men of [the] case . . . is contractual [and] [a]ny duties between the parties
arose out of the contracts;”166 therefore, Lesmeister concluded, the only
claims available were contractual because the only damages sought were for
economic losses.167
The Glorvigen majority misapplied Minnesota law. The majority fo-
cused on cases involving purely economic losses rather than damage to the
person. This misapplication effectively created new law and foreclosed re-
course to injured parties for damages outside breach of contract, even when
noneconomic losses are involved. The dissent said it best:
If the mere presence of a contract foreclosed all tort liability,
medical malpractice claims would cease to exist. A passenger in-
jured in a car accident while riding in a taxi cab would have only
a breach of contract claim against the cab driver and cab com-
pany. A paid babysitter who failed to prevent injury to a child
would be liable only in contract. The list goes on.168
Glorvigen’s second holding leaves many questions unanswered. If
Minnesota does not recognize a duty in tort arising solely under contract,
how will this unfold in future claims? For example, Clark hires Kent to salt
his sidewalk every morning from September through April.169 Kent was out
working late in mid-January and fails to salt Clark’s sidewalk one morning
because he slept through an alarm. Clark slips on his sidewalk due to Kent’s
negligence (and breach of contract), breaking his leg. The duty that Kent
owed Clark arose from a contract and the parties would not have had a
relationship but for that contract. However, by the parties’ actions, a duty
arose in tort whereby Clark is relying on Kent to salt his sidewalk every
morning because Kent undertook the duty to do so. Is a court going to look
through the contract and allow recovery in tort, or ignore the negligence and
hold that Kent owes Clark only the wages it would cost for someone else to
do Kent’s work for the day Kent failed to salt Clark’s sidewalk? If Clark
4a.” Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) aff’d, 816
N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012).
164. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 584 (citing United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 622 (8th
Cir. 1988) (citing Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Minn. 1983)).
165. Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Minn. 1983). It is important to note that plain-
tiffs in Glorvigen did not assert a “negligent breach of contract” as discussed in Lesmeister. Such a
claim would be for economic losses rather than for damage to property, and the economic loss
doctrine would bar such claims.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 589 (Anderson, P., J., dissenting).
169. It is important to note that this example involves a service contract, and therefore, the
economic loss doctrine would not apply.
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were only able to recover contract damages, he would not be able to recover
for his hospital bills, medication, subsequent treatment or therapy, or lost
wages for days of work missed due to the injury.170
Laska suggests that the courts should look through the contract and
find the duty such a defendant undertook.171 By looking through the con-
tract, a court may establish a separate special relationship, thereby estab-
lishing a duty under a common law undertaking rather than the contract,
allowing Clark to recover from Kent’s negligence. However, until
Glorvigen is overruled, the distinction between claims for noneconomic
losses and claims for purely economic losses will be muddled by courts
citing Glorvigen as authority when only the latter is involved.172
Part of the problem with the Minnesota Supreme Court choosing to
ignore black letter law is the challenge of how this decision will unfold in
future litigation.173 Parties may freely enter contracts involving limitations
of liability,174 so why is the Minnesota Supreme Court unwilling to allow
recovery in tort when the breach of a contractual duty results in a personal
injury? Whether operating solely within the contract or beyond it, there is a
possibility that a duty may arise. However, that duty must not arise solely
from the contract for a party to recover in tort. Simply put, the parties
would have to contract into a special relationship—any other form of ac-
cepting a tort duty under contract will not suffice. However, after
Glorvigen, consumers may not even have this option.
CONCLUSION
Holding that manufacturers have no “duty to train” weighs heavily in
favor of public policy. However, it seems the Glorvigen majority had tunnel
170. See Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic Analysis of
Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 390, 398–401 (1997).
171. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 140.
172. A Minnesota District Court cited Glorvigen in February 2013 as authority when only
economic losses were involved. See Cargill, Inc. v. Ron Burge Trucking, Inc., CIV. 11-2394
PAM/JJK, 2013 WL 608520, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). In Cargill, the Plaintiff claimed that
a bailment relationship imposed duties of care that sound in negligence, arising from the parties’
contract. Rather than holding that the economic loss doctrine barred recovery for such a claim, the
court stated that “Glorvigen held that when a contract imposes the only duties between the parties,
a negligence action will not lie.” Id. at *3.
173. At least eight courts have cited Glorvigen as authority for the proposition that tort liabil-
ity does not arise when the duty breached is imposed by contract. See CenturyLink, A12-0884,
2013 WL 400354, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2013), review denied (Minn., Apr. 16, 2013);
Target Corp. v. LCH Pavement Consultants, LLC, CIV. 12-1912 JNE/JJK, 2013 WL 2470148, at
*1 (D. Minn. June 7, 2013); Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ill. Paper & Copier Co., 732 F.3d 755 (7th
Cir. 2013) certified question answered, 848 N.W.2d 539 (Minn. 2014); Carlson, Inc. v. Int’l Bus.
Machines Corp., 10-CV-3410 JNE/TNL, 2013 WL 6007508, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2013);
Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ill. Paper & Copier Co., 848 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 2014); Common-
wealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Historic Ivy Tower, LLC, A13-1621, 2014 WL 3799607, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2014); Weiss v. Private Capital, LLC, A13-2029, 2014 WL 4175867, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2014).
174. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719 (1991); Minn. Stat. § 336.2-719(3) (1988).
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vision in promoting these policy considerations by also broadly holding that
a duty in tort may not arise from a contract. If the court had held that manu-
facturers had a “duty to train,” it would have been imputing a new duty on
manufacturers outside the scope and purpose of products liability. Yet, to
achieve this goal while still protecting consumers, the Minnesota Supreme
Court should not have broadly held that a duty in tort may not arise from a
contract. Although public policy favors against imputing a “duty to train”
on manufacturers, it is dissonant to also hold that parties may not bargain
their own terms for such liability. If courts want to avoid imputing duties
onto manufacturers, then contracting in and out of duties provides a great
solution, retaining the underlying policy reasons behind products liability
while sticking with our tradition of freedom to contract. Most importantly,
it avoids a grossly unfair result for consumers.
Always read the exclusionary clause.175
175. Under Minnesota law, a buyer may not bring a product defect tort claim for compensa-
tory damages unless the defect “caused harm to the buyer’s tangible personal property other than
the goods or to the buyer’s real property.” Minn. Stat. § 604.101, subd. 3 (2010). However, no bar
exists for claims involving injury to the person. Id. at subd. 2.
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